One of the few points of consensus between the administrations of Barack Obama and Donald Trump is their belief that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was too hesitant to take decisive action. “The issue with Bibi is that he’s a coward,” a senior official from the Obama administration remarked to The Atlantic’s Jeffrey Goldberg in 2014, suggesting that Netanyahu was “afraid to initiate conflicts.” Fast forward nine years, and Trump would recount at a campaign rally that Netanyahu had initially agreed to participate in America’s 2020 operation against Qassem Soleimani, the infamous leader of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, but ultimately withdrew at the last moment. “I’ll always remember how Bibi Netanyahu let us down,” Trump expressed to his audience shortly after the Hamas attack in 2023.
That was a different time. Evaluations of Netanyahu seem ridiculous now, as Israel engages in its second war against Iran, having dismantled the regime’s proxy forces—Hamas and Hezbollah—and eliminated its top leader. However, Netanyahu’s American detractors accurately depicted his actions up until October 7, 2023. For many years, the Israeli prime minister made bold claims while wielding minimal power. Despite issuing countless warnings regarding Iran’s nuclear aspirations—in Israel, the U.S. Congress, and the United Nations—Netanyahu failed to substantiate his aggressive statements with tangible measures on the ground.
Netanyahu’s Hesitation in Leadership
That is, until 2024. The Netanyahu currently leading a precarious offensive against Tehran is not the same individual who ruled Israel for almost twenty years before. Moreover, the nation he governs has undergone significant changes as well.
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Prior to this significant change, Netanyahu’s tenure as prime minister was grounded in a strategy of avoiding conflict. This approach resonated with a cautious electorate. During his time in office, Israeli voters who preferred the existing situation could feel secure, knowing their leader was unlikely to disrupt it.
Obama and Trump’s Critique
“Contrary to his reputation, Netanyahu is not a proponent of war,” wrote Anshel Pfeffer, a biographer and one of the prime minister’s left-leaning critics, in 2018. “He is the most cautious of Israeli leaders, reluctant to engage in conflict or pursue peace.” At that time, Pfeffer accurately foresaw that Israel would refrain from going to war with Iran, even with a supportive Trump administration backing them.
Netanyahu exhibited a cautious nature, shaped by both his personality and his past. His elder brother, Yoni, lost his life during a hostage-rescue operation in 1976. As the head of the parliamentary opposition, Netanyahu witnessed a devastating conflict in Lebanon undermine the reputation of Ehud Olmert, his center-left predecessor in the role of prime minister. A skilled communicator adept at managing his public image, Netanyahu recognized that wars are unpredictable and cannot be choreographed. Instead of confronting Tehran directly, he opted to engage in a more covert approach, advocating for international sanctions publicly while discreetly launching a secret initiative to disrupt Iran’s nuclear ambitions from within.
This inclination towards containment rather than open warfare was not limited to Iran; it also extended to the neighboring territory. For years, Netanyahu resisted pressure from his own right-wing coalition to invade Gaza and overthrow its militant leaders. In his memoir published in 2022, Netanyahu expressed pride in having dismissed these calls for military action. “Concluding these types of operations is far more challenging than initiating them,” he remarked. “The public consistently anticipates that the government will persist in the fight and ‘flatten Gaza,’ assuming that sufficient punishment would lead to the downfall of the Hamas regime. However, that would only occur if we deployed the army. The toll would escalate: hundreds of Israeli casualties and thousands on the Palestinian side. Did I genuinely want to commit the IDF to Gaza for years while we faced challenges with Iran and a potential Syrian front? The answer was a definitive no.” Instead, Netanyahu chose to weaken Hamas through targeted airstrikes and sought to secure peace by channeling millions of dollars from Qatar to the group.
Conflicts and Strategic Decisions
The massacre carried out by Hamas on October 7—whose horrific acts were streamed live by the attackers and etched into the minds of Israelis—shattered and undermined this strategy. With Israel’s border regions devastated and numerous citizens taken captive, the electorate could no longer tolerate their leader’s passivity, which now appeared to be a monumental error. An Israeli populace that had chosen Netanyahu to safeguard their security now felt deeply vulnerable and called for decisive measures. Merely responding to the assault was insufficient; the government had to guarantee that similar incidents would never recur by tackling threats at their origin.
Since 2014, Netanyahu had refrained from deploying Israeli ground forces into Gaza. However, following the events of October 7, that reluctance became untenable. He launched the very offensive in Gaza that he had previously cautioned against. This devastating and frequently tumultuous conflict resulted in more casualties among Israelis and Palestinians than any prior war, ravaged extensive areas of the enclave, bolstered Israel’s extremists who aimed to occupy the land, and significantly diminished Israel’s reputation on the global stage.
Initially, Netanyahu instinctively hesitated to escalate the conflict further. Following the events of October 7, when his defense minister and other security leaders advocated for Israel to target not only Hamas but also Hezbollah, Netanyahu held back. At that moment, the Lebanese militia was launching rockets into Israel in support of Hamas, yet it was arguably the most formidable nonstate military force globally, and a rattled Netanyahu was reluctant to confront it.
The Soleimani Operation Withdrawal
Similar to the situation in Gaza, the Iranian ally ultimately compelled Netanyahu to act. For over 11 months, Hezbollah relentlessly bombarded Israel’s northern regions, decimating communities and necessitating the evacuation of nearly 70,000 Israelis. This widespread destruction and displacement exerted significant pressure on Israel’s social fabric—and increasingly burdened its leader. Ultimately, in September 2024, following a series of retaliatory strikes, Netanyahu initiated a comprehensive offensive against Hezbollah, utilizing powerful explosives and advanced munitions. Then, unexpectedly, everything unfolded as intended.
The leader of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, was killed, along with almost his entire command structure. Hezbollah suffered significant losses and was soon forced to agree to a cease-fire on Israel’s conditions. Without his enforcers, Syria’s pro-Iranian leader, Bashar al-Assad, quickly fell as well. What began as total war transformed into nearly complete victory. Concurrently, another related conflict further strengthened Netanyahu’s position. Following Israel’s attack on a consular annex in Syria and the assassination of Nasrallah, Iran retaliated with hundreds of missiles and drones, marking the largest assaults in history. However, Israel not only successfully intercepted most of the incoming projectiles but also managed to breach and neutralize some of Iran’s most critical air defense systems.
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With each successful escalation, Netanyahu’s readiness to employ force to resolve Israel’s grievances grew. This increasing assurance peaked during the 12-day conflict last June, where Israel established air superiority over Iran, targeted its nuclear facilities, and eliminated a significant portion of the nation’s military and intelligence leadership, all while sustaining no fatalities among its troops. Initially, Israel’s military strategists had anticipated over 400 casualties on the home front due to Iranian missile and drone strikes; ultimately, the toll was just 28.
Critics of Israel frequently emphasize that the radicalization of Palestinians stems more from ongoing Israeli occupation, violence, and dispossession than from deep-seated ideology. However, this reasoning applies in both directions. Netanyahu and the Israeli populace would likely not have tolerated such drastic military measures had they not endured the unimaginable tragedies of October 7, along with the relentless bombardments from Hezbollah’s rockets and Iran’s missiles.
This cycle has culminated in Netanyahu’s most audacious and significant wager yet. Shedding his previous caution, he has staked his political destiny—and that of his nation—on Israel’s capacity to tackle not just the Iranian regime but also its allies in Hezbollah and the Houthis, all while navigating the unpredictable Trump, who could announce an untimely victory and withdraw from the scene at any moment. The success of this strategy remains uncertain, and one should be wary of anyone who claims otherwise. However, what is evident is that the Israel and Netanyahu of October 6, 2023, are irretrievably lost.
